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Background
More than two decades ago, e-mail systems were popular among only restricted people, such as researchers, as a private communication tool. Also, the performance of the Internet was very poor, so that we had to suffer from non-negligible delay time. As the Internet rapidly grows, however, e-mails have become one of the most commonly used communication tools, and the importance of e-mails has grown accordingly. For example, we use e-mails for ordering products, trading stocks, submitting research papers, and so on. As a consequence, the demands on certified emails are also growing.
Our basic model on certified e-mails is as follows. There are a sender A and a receiver B. A typical conflicts between them is that A claims to have sent a message to B but B denies receiving it. This can be resolved by simply letting B send a receipt to A, upon receiving the message. However, B does not want to send a receipt before receiving a message from A; they want to exchange message and receipt "simultaneously." If we use a Trusted Third Party (TTP), we can easily satisfy the above requirement. In fact, a lot of certified e-mail systems using TTPs have already been proposed and commercial services (e.g. USPS started in 2001) have been launched. However, since employing a TTP is costly, it is much more desirable to realize the system without it.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we discuss how to develop a certified email exchange system without TTPs. First, we consider the following protocol, which uses a public-key cryptosystem: A and B encrypt the message using their own public keys (of the same length), and exchange them (not necessarily simultaneously). Subsequently, A and B exchange the secret keys simultaneously. In this way, our problem can be reduced to the problem of exchanging the secrets of the same lengths. This problem is known as the simultaneous secret exchange, and there have been proposed several protocols. In this work, we select the one by Okamoto and Ohta [5] because the number of rounds it requires is small compared to other similar protocols.
Simply speaking, in Okamoto and Ohta's protocol, two parties basically exchange secrets bit-by-bit to keep the fairness of the protocol. Hence if the secrets are of n bits long each, then the number of rounds is 2n+2, which is still large considering applications. To resolve this problem, we propose a method of sending several bits in one round. More specifically, each sends one bit at the first round, but gradually (exponentially) increase the number of bits sent in one round. This allows us to complete the protocol in O(log n) rounds. We show that this extension does not lose the fairness too much.
We then consider how to include the above method into e-mail systems. Although theoretical work can usually be completed by only considering two agents, often refereed to as Alice and Bob, if we consider implementations, we need to care about several softwares, e.g. MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents, e.g. an SMTP server) and MUAs (Mail User Agents, e.g. a client software). We propose three different models and discuss the advantages of each model. For example, one allows send-and-forget for the sender in some situation, or the other allows to exchange messages between the sender and the receiver directly.
Finally, we adopt two of the above three models, and implement the protocol as a prototype. For the secret exchange sessions, we selected the XML format, which is sent by an e-mail attachment.
Organization of this Paper
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Sec. 2, we show related work on certified e-mail systems and simultaneous secret exchange protocols. We also describe a protocol proposed by Okamoto and Ohta [5] . In Sec. 3, we discuss how to reduce the number of sessions of their protocol. We then describe a design of our protocol in Sec. 4 , and its implementation in Sec. 5. Finally, in Sec. 6, we conclude this paper.
Related Works
As we have already mentioned in Sec. 1, there have been a lot of research on certified mails. Most of them are based on contract signing, so in this section, we also survey research on contract signing. These research seem to be classified by the degree how much they depend on TTPs.
The first type uses a TTP deeply, which serves as an intermediary. This type is the most popular, some of which are commercialized (see Zhou and Gollman [7] for example). Some of the weak point of this type are that the system must heavily depend on the reliability of TTPs, and that the cost for TTPs tends to be large.
Second type assumes the existence of a TTP, which serves only as a reliable source of randomness and as a judge [1, 6] . But this type is applied only to contract signing, not to certified e-mails in the literature.
The last type realizes certified e-mail system without TTPs. The sender or the receiver claims to a TTP (e.g. a court) only in case of a dispute, and he/she can prove innocence if he/she has executed the procedure honestly. Luby et al. [4] developed a primitive of simultaneous secret exchange. In their protocol, two parties exchange a secret bit using the result of flipping a slightly biased coin. Blum [2] proposed a concept of gradual secret exchange protocol and designed a protocol based on the factoring problem. Even, Goldreich and Lempel's protocols [3] are based on Oblivious Transfer. Okamoto and Ohta [5] also proposed some simultaneous secret exchange protocols based on one-way permutations or one-way functions. In spite of some apparent advantages, research on this model concentrate only on theoretical aspects, and there seems to be almost no research on designing certified e-mail exchange systems based on these theories.
Simultaneous Secret Exchange Protocol
According to [5] , a simultaneous secret exchange protocol is a protocol of exchanging secret fairly in the following senses: Correctness: Each party can check the validity of each bit at each stage, to ensure that a garbage has not been received. If this is not guaranteed, cheating can be detected only after all n bits are sent. In this case, dishonest party have obtained correct bits, while honest party obtains garbage bits. Fairness: Let T (i) be the time of computing the remaining i bits when Bob receives first (n − i) bits of the secret. The difference between T (i) and T (i−1) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) should be as small as possible. If the difference is non-negligible, then Bob has non-negligible advantage over Alice at the stage that Alice has released (n − i + 1) bits and Bob has released (n − i) bits.
We compare three secret exchange methods in terms of these requirements in Table 1 . "Simple sending" means that both players send the secrets ad-hoc. "Bit-by-bit" is the method such that each player sends one bit alternately. " " ("×", respectively) in the entries means that the requirement is satisfied (unsatisfied, respectively) by the corresponding protocol.
Table 1. Comparison of Each Method
Correctness Fairness simple sending × × bit-by-bit exchange × simultaneous secret exchange
Okamoto and Ohta's Protocol
Okamoto and Ohta [5] proposed several simultaneous secret exchange protocols, one of which uses one-way permutations. In their protocol, Alice and Bob send one bit at each round. However, they commit each other the whole secret at the beginning, in the manner which makes it possible for the receiver to verify at each round the correctness of the bit he/she received.
In the following, we assume that the sender Alice wants to send a secret of n-bit string s A to the receiver Bob. In applying this procedure to simultaneous secret exchange, both Alice and Bob execute this protocol bi-directionally.
Step 1. Let F be a family of tight one-way permutations, and f σ i ∈ F , where i denotes the security parameter.
Here F consists of
where f σ i is uniquely determined by σ i . The sender Alice randomly generates the parameters of F , σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n . Then Alice calculates n-bit string X as follows:
Here, x||y means the concatenation of strings x and y.
Step 2. Alice sends (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n ) and X to Bob to commit Alice's secret s A .
Step 3. When Bob receives them, Bob checks whether (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n ) are valid for the parameters of F , and whether X ∈ {0, 1} n . If they do not hold, Bob terminates the protocol.
[End of commitment stage]
Step 4. In a descending order of i = n, . . . , 1, Alice sends x * i to Bob.
Step 5. When i = n, Bob checks whether X = f σ n (x * n ) holds or not. When i = n − 1, . . . , 1, Bob checks whether
Here, [x] a denotes the last a bits of x, and [x]
a denotes the first a bits of x. If it does not hold, Bob terminates the protocol. Finally, Bob obtains x i from each x * i for all i (since
.
[End of secret releasing stage]
This is one of the most efficient protocols in terms of the number of sessions needed between Alice and Bob. For example, the protocol by Even et al. [3] requires 3n transfers (n Oblivious Transfers and 2n normal transfers) to exchange two n-bit keys. In contrast, Okamoto and Ohta's protocol requires only 2n + 2 normal transfers. This property is clearly significant in applying the protocol to the mail exchange. Considering these advantages, we use Okamoto and Ohta's protocol as a basis of our system.
Reducing the Number of Sessions
Although we selected Okamoto and Ohta's protocol for their efficiency, over 100 transactions are still needed to exchange 64 bits of secret keys. Thus we want to reduce the number of sessions to reduce the time needed to complete the protocol.
First, consider the original protocol, in which the secrets are exchanged bit-by-bit, and suppose that one party, say Bob, quits the protocol before completion. If he has so far received i bits, his search space is 2 n−i . However, Alice has already received at least i−1 bits and hence her search space is at most 2 n−i+1 . So, the "unfairness" in this sense differs at most twice at any time.
A simple way one may consider for reducing the number of rounds is to send several bits in one round. If each party sends k bits at each round, the total number of rounds is reduced to (2n + 2)/k but the unfairness is increased to 2 k (meaning that Alice's search space is 2 k times larger than that of Bob in the worst case). Hence there is a tradeoff between unfairness and the number of rounds.
Consider the above situation again. After Alice and Bob receive i − 1 and i bits, respectively, their search spaces are 2 n−i+1 and 2 n−i , respectively. Usually, time needed for an exhaustive search is linear in the search space, so the remaining time needed to find a key is proportional to the remaining search space. It is then much more reasonable to define the unfairness not in terms of the ratio but of the difference between the search space, which is 2 n−i+1 − 2 n−i = 2 n−i in the current example. This suggests that the first bit is the most significant and the importance of one bit gradually decreases as the protocol proceeds.
Considering the above observation, we adopt the "doubling method," in which each party sends twice as many bits as the previous round. For example, one bit is sent at the first round, two bits at the second, four bits at the third, and so on. Using this method, the number of rounds is reduced to O(log n), which is an exponential improvement.
Protocol Design
Outline of the Protocol
We first explain a basic protocol, in which Alice sends a message and Bob sends a receipt. The basic procedure is executed as follows. We assume that all the messages are accompanied with signature.
Step 1. Alice generates a message M, and writes an abstract of M. She then generates a secret key K a , and encrypts M with K a . Let E K a (M) be the obtained ciphertext. Alice then creates X from K a using Step 1 of Okamoto and Ohta's protocol with parameter P a . Alice sends E K a (M), X, and P a to Bob.
Step 2. When Bob receives the first message from Alice, he checks its validity and reads the contained abstract. If he decides to receive the message, he generates a receipt token (R) that contains the abstract of his message, his signature, and the date. Then he generates a secret key K b , encrypts R with it, and obtains E K b (R). Then he also generates Y from K b using Step 1 of Okamoto and Ohta's protocol with parameter P b . He sends E K b (R), Y, and P b to Alice.
(If Alice can decode E K b (R) and obtains R, she can claim that Bob certainly received the Message. Here, Alice and Bob use the same encryption method, and K a and K b are of the same length.)
Step 3. Alice and Bob execute the simultaneous secret exchange protocol to exchange K a and K b , using Okamoto and Ohta's protocol. The protocol begins from Alice's side.
Step 4. Alice obtains K b , decrypts E K b (R) with K b , and obtains R. Similarly, Bob obtains M using K a .
Step 5. Each of them confirms the contents. Alice generates a digest H(R) of M. She sends H(R) to Bob.
Step 6. Bob receives H(R). If H(R)
is correct, he also generates H(M) and sends it to Alice.
Step 7. Alice confirms H(M) and if it is correct, terminates this procedure.
Implementation Models
For the later convenience, let us call Step 1, Step 2, and Steps 3-7 the message-sending-session, receipt-sendingsession, and secret-exchange-session, respectively. As mentioned previously, we assume that each party consists of a user, an MUA, and an MTA. Each user trusts the MTA, and can delegate some part of procedures. Under such an assumption, we propose three types of the implementation. In all of the three cases, message-sending-session is the same, namely, Alice sends encrypted message using MTA and MUA in Steps 1. The differences are whether Alice and/or Bob is involved in the receipt-sending-session and/or the secret-exchange-session. We also investigate the advantages and disadvantages of each model. In particular, we consider the possibility of send-and-forget, a good property which is often discussed in the field of certified mails. Sendand-forget means that "the sender need not wait for session after he/she sends the first message, and all he/she needs to do is only to wait". (Fig. 1) . At the receipt-sending-session, Bob's encrypted receipt reaches Alice in the reverse direction of Step 1, namely in the order of 3, 2 and 1 in Fig. 1 , and both Alice and Bob are involved in the secret-exchangesession. As for the advantage, the protocol can be performed only by the users and hence they do not need to control MTAs. They do not install the system to MTA's but only to their MUAs. As for the disadvantage, Alice needs to wait for Bob's response. So send-and-forget cannot be realized. In addition, it is often difficult to execute the secret-exchange-session other than e-mails, since end-users are usually protected by firewalls, NAT, and so on. (Fig. 2) . Alice's MTA receives Bob's encrypted receipt at the receipt-sending-session, and the secret-exchange-session is performed by Alice's MTA and Bob's MTA. In this model, an apparent advantage is that we can realize send-and-forget. As for a disadvantage, introduction cost is large compared to Direct Model, i.e., Both Alice and Bob need to introduce the system to their MTAs. (Fig. 3) . Similarly as Agent Model, Alice's MTA receives Bob's encrypted receipt at the receipt-sending-session, but this time, the secret-exchangesession is performed by Alice's MTA and Bob. Simply speaking, this model lies between Direct Model and Agent Model. In this model, send-and-forget is realized. Introduction cost is lower than Agent Model. In addition, the secret-exchange-session can be realized by protocols other than e-mail more easily than Direct Model. For disadvantages, only Alice can send certified mail to Bob because of the asymmetry of the system. To make it bi-directional, both sides need to introduce the system of this model, but it may be more costly than Agent Model.
Direct Model
Agent Model
Figure 3. Half agent model
Considering these advantages and disadvantages, we decided to use Direct Model and Half Agent Model in our system, and combine them so that Alice can select which one to use depending on her environment.
Session Management
Format for the Secret-Exchange-Session. We need to decide the method used in the secret-exchange-session (Steps 3-7) of our protocol. For simplicity, we decided to use XML format, whose details will be defined Sec. 4.5. Each party attaches this XML message to an e-mail and sends it.
Mail ID and Session ID. In this system, each certified e-mail session has the unique ID (which we call 'MID,' standing for the 'mail ID'). Each certified e-mail session executes a simultaneous secret exchange session, which contains two gradual secret exchange protocols. Then we assign the unique ID for each gradual secret-exchange-session (which we call 'SID,' standing for the 'session ID').
The MID and the first SID are generated by the sender Alice and stored in her client. If she uses the MTA, the MTA stores the MID and the SID. When Bob receives the message from Alice or her agent, he stores SID and MID, generates another SID, and stores it. Here, there are one MID and two SIDs. Bob sends the SID he generated to Alice. Alice, or her agent, who receives the encrypted receipt stores another SID.
Expiration Time. When each SID is generated, an optional expiration time is associated. Each player stores the expiration time with SID. In case one of the expiration time comes before the completion, he/she must report time-out error. We consider the routine for errors in the next subsection.
Error Handling
During the execution of the protocol, several errors are supposed to happen. We classify errors into three categories and assign error codes. If an error occurs, each party should inform it to the other at the next subsession along with error codes using the XML format. Error codes are categorized as follows:
Protocol Errors. The message is invalid so that parties cannot process it, e.g. "400: Bad Request," "412: Request Too Large," and "416: Contents Invalid." Processing Errors. Failures and halts happened in processing. This includes user-oriented ones, e.g. "408: Time Expired," "481: Call/Transaction Not exist," and "486: Now Busy reported." User Errors. User-oriented halts, e.g. "488: Not Acceptable," "489: Value Not Match," and "430: Terminated."
Restart Session. Some error occur even if the transaction has no fault. In such a case, the party receiving the error report can select to restart sessions if the reported error is '408: Time Expired' or '486: Now Busy.' If he/she wants to restart the session, he/she behaves as follows:
• In case of 408, he/she can regenerate new sessions with new SID under the same MID. To regenerate sessions, he/she should send a request for restarting the session.
• In case of 486, he/she can restart the session. He/she needs to resend the same transaction within constant intervals.
In addition, if he/she cannot receive the responding transaction, he/she can resend the same transaction to the other. If a party receives the same message twice or more, it must ignore it without reporting '481 Call/Transaction Not exist.' This option is needed to avoid the case that each party waits the other forever, which can happen, e.g., when the transaction mail disappears.
Message Format
We designed a message format so that it fits to the XML list. We first show an example of the message format, to be sent from Alice to Bob at Step 1.
<send> <mid>83f93ac93dabd342</mid> <sid>f39aac353d2f0235</sid> <from>alice@i.kyoto-u.ac.jp</from> <to>bob@i.net.ist.kyoto-u.ac.jp</to> <mail-dest>alice@cmtp.net.ist.i.kyoto-u.ac.jp </mail-dest> <date>20011101184732</date> <expire>20011102184732</expire> <abst>(abstract of message)</abst> <c-mes>(encrypted message)</c-mes> <key type="DES" length="64"/> <protocol type="okamoto"> <envelope>(transformed secret key)</envelope> <params> <param num="1">(parameter 1)</param> <param num="2">(parameter 2)</param> <param num="3">(parameter 3)</param> <param num="4">(parameter 4)</param> <param num="5">(parameter 5)</param> <param num="6">(parameter 6)</param> ... <param num="64">(parameter64)</param> </params> </protocol> </send>
Here are definitions of elements in the format.
• mid: Unique ID provided for each certified mail.
• sid: Unique ID provided for each secret-exchangesession. Two sids correspond to one mid.
• from: Mail address of the message sender.
• to: Mail address of the message receiver.
• mail-dest: Mail address of the agent used when receiver wishes to perform secret-exchange-session by e-mail. This element is mandatory.
• date: Time Stamp. Recorded in a format "YYYYMMDDttmmss."
• expire: Expiration time of SID.
• abst: Abstract of the message. This message is written in the main body of the e-mail.
• c-msg: Encrypted message. This element is written in Base64 format. This element corresponds to E k a (M).
• key: The format type and the length of the secret key used to encrypt the message. Each of them is described as attributes of the element.
• protocol: Specification of the protocol type used in the secret-exchange-session. (At this time, only "okamoto" is supported.) • envelope: Transformed secret key, corresponding to X in Okamoto and Ohta's protocol.
• param: Parameters used to determine one-way permutation, corresponding to P a in Okamoto and Ohta's protocol.
Implementation
We implemented the above protocol as a prototype system using Java language. We give an overview of our prototype in Fig. 4 . This system consists of three parts: the sender client (MUA), the sender server (MTA), and the receiver client (MUA), each having an e-mail addresses alice@sender.net, agentserver@sender.net, and bob@receiver.net, respectively.
The sender can send a certified mail using Direct Model by sending a certified mail to bob@receiver.net directly, or using Half Agent Model by sending to agentserver@sender.net with pointing Bob's address in the transaction XML. In the latter case, when the sender server receives the message, it analyzes the transaction XML, rewrites the destination to bob@receiver.net, and executes the sessions with the receiver client. In this way, the sender client can select one of the two models easily.
As for the secret-exchange-session, we adopted a weaker form of the doubling method, namely, in the first n/2 rounds each player sends one bit per round, and after that, doubles the number of bits, which requires n + O(log n) rounds.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a design of certified mail exchange protocol. We decided to use simultaneous secret exchange protocol as a subroutine, and adopted Okamoto and Ohta's protocol [5] . We reduced the number of sessions in their protocol, and then, discussed advantages and disadvantages of the implementation models. We adopted two models and implemented a prototype using JAVA language.
Finally, we mention some of possible future works. (1) We have developed a prototype system but have not yet tested or evaluated its performance. As a next step, we need to evaluate its security and efficiency. Furthermore, we should develop a complete system and evaluate its performance using the Internet. (2) In Sec. 3, we assumed an exhaustive search when claiming that the fairness is not lost even in the doubling method. This assumption is plausible in case without commitment at the beginning such as bit-bybit exchange, but may not be true for Okamoto and Ohta's protocol. We need to prove the fairness of our method under weaker assumptions. (3) In Okamoto and Ohta's protocol (or in secret exchange protocols in general), we can verify at each step that the received bit is not garbage. However, we cannot prevent the cheating that a garbage string is committed at the beginning. It is interesting to develop a system that is robust for this attack by, for example, combining Okamoto and Ohta's protocol with some suitable cryptosystems.
